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T
his issue of CentrePiece
celebrates the presentation
to the CEP this month of a
Queen’s Anniversary Prize
for its research over the
years since it was set up in 1990.
The citation recognises us as “a
centre of national and international
excellence in the application of
economic theory and rigorous
empirical analysis to issues of
unemployment, productivity, education
and international trade”. It is a
particular source of satisfaction to us
that we have been recognised as
having “had a significant impact on
government policy in the UK and more
widely”. For that has been our
purpose from the start.
We set out to identify major issues in
the real world and to organise a
critical mass of senior and junior
scholars to attack them. We have
always regarded a tough attitude to
theory as the vital framework for
empirical work. But we also think that
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by Richard Layard
Richard Layard looks back on the achievements
marked by the Queen’s Anniversary Prize award.
research is not much help if it does
not yield equations with parameters
that can be estimated. 
Research at the Centre has benefited
from three central features in our
approach. First, unlike other
institutions, where supply-side
microeconomics and demand-side
Cause for
celebration
macroeconomics are treated
separately, the CEP brought them
together from the start. Second, those
working at the Centre enjoy a quality
of IT support, with specialist staff to
organise the databases for all the key
British and European surveys and
data series, that is not bettered
anywhere. We now also enjoy the
excellent working conditions of the
new LSE Research Lab, designed by
Norman Foster. Third, as a research
centre, the CEP has actively trained
PhD students by an apprenticeship
system, with younger scholars
working with senior staff and often
publishing their first papers as joint
authors. An average of six PhDs have
been awarded annually, with two
thirds of the current 30 PhD students
coming from continental Europe. We
also run a successful two-year MSc
programme for future economic
decision makers. 
By any standards, the quality and
volume of the research generated
since 1990 has been impressive. As
the citation recognises, we have had
a significant impact on a wide range
of policy. Employment, unemployment
and poverty have been (and remain)
an important focus of our activity. 
In Britain, governments (both
Conservative and Labour) have
accepted our evidence that long-term
unemployment is a feeble weapon
against inflation, compared with short-
run unemployment. In all major
industrial countries now, the main
policy aim is to reduce long-term
unemployment rather than to spend
money trying to stem the flow into
short-term unemployment. Since 1997
all EU countries have agreed to
ensure that everyone becoming
unemployed is offered economic
activity within a year.
We demonstrated the benefits of
replacing long-term social security
payments by active and effective help
in finding worthwhile jobs. The result
was the introduction of New Deal type
policies in Britain, Denmark and The
Netherlands and the merging of
benefit offices and job centres in the
UK into the new Jobcentre Plus
organisation.
Our research drew attention for the
first time to the high proportion of the
UK population living in totally workless
households and to the disincentive
effects of low take-home pay for those
entering the job market at the bottom
of the wage ladder. This combination
was highlighted as a major cause of
poverty, especially child poverty.
Policy makers responded by
introducing the Working Family Tax
Credit scheme, work-focused
interviews at Jobcentres and the
National Minimum Wage. Research at
the Centre had correctly predicted
that a minimum wage set at £3.60 an
hour in 1998 would, contrary to
widespread opinion, have little or no
negative effect on employment.
As productivity and incomes became
an important policy focus in the
1990s, we established a major
programme on the economics of
education, a key subject neglected in
Britain for a quarter of a century. The
group running this successful
programme since 1995 was then
selected by what is now the
Department for Education and Skills
to lead a new tripartite research
centre – the Centre for the
Economics of Education – which
brings together the CEP with the
Institute of Fiscal Studies and the
Institute of Education. The work in this
area, in particular on apprenticeship
and on adult literacy and numeracy,
has led directly to important
government initiatives.
In the same way, the Centre has
reacted effectively to other real issues
as they have emerged. In 1995 we
created a new programme, with a
staff of about 20, to study the issues
related to globalisation and economic
geography. This is now the leading
international trade group at any
European university. We also became
closely involved throughout the 1990s
in the post-Communist transition
processes in Russia, Poland and
elsewhere. More recently we have
channelled our research effort into
new directions, such as the impact of
the Internet, the effect of international
capital flows on economic stability and
the relationship between income
levels and economic well-being. 
Looking back on what has been
achieved since 1990, our direct and
personal influence on policy matters
has also been out of all proportion to
our size. Of past and present
members of the Centre, Charles Bean
is now the Bank of England’s Chief
Economist; Stephen Nickell, Sushil
Wadhwani and Willem Buiter are, or
have been, members of the Bank’s
Monetary Policy Committee; David
Metcalf has been a key member of the
Low Pay Commission since it was
established; Paul Gregg has been a
member of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer’s Council of Economic
Advisors focusing on poverty; and
Stanislav Gomulka was the lead
author of the Polish Solidarity
government’s economic reform plan,
which became a model for post-
Communist change in the other
countries of east and central Europe. 
From the start we disseminated our
work as widely as possible. We run
five field seminars a week, in order to
subject research to criticism at an
early stage. We organise an average
of eight conferences a year and
publish about 50 Discussion 
Papers, all of which can be seen on
our web site. Since 1990 the CEP’s
staff has published 101 books, 540
chapters in books and 780 articles 
in refereed journals. 
We are grateful to the ESRC and our
other donors without whose help
none of this would have been
possible. We believe that we have
made and are continuing to make a
contribution to applied economic
research that is without rival in
Europe. It is, therefore, most
satisfying to us all that our efforts
have been recognised in the award of
this Queen’s Anniversary Prize.
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Richard Layard has been Director of the
CEP since it was established.
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E
ducation is widely championed as a means of
lessening economic and social inequalities. It
should enable children of high ability to improve
their lot, irrespective of family background. 
So what should we think if the evidence is that the recent
expansion of post-16 schooling has disproportionately
benefited children from richer backgrounds? If, in particu-
lar, the expansion of the higher education system has also
benefited children from higher income families, does this
not have serious ramifications for future inequality?
Graduates earn more in later life and so higher education
would be reinforcing links in economic status across gener-
ations, thereby reducing intergenerational mobility. Where
does that leave the Labour government's target of 50% of
under-30s entering higher education by 2010?
Figure 1 shows the rapid expansion of education participa-
tion since 1960. It confirms that higher education participa-
tion was low at the start of the 1960s, at around 6% of the
18 to 19 year old age cohort. It rose to about 14% by the
mid-1970s, before dropping back a little in the late
1970s.The first part of the 1980s saw small increases in
most years, but the expansion from the late 1980s was then
very rapid. By 2000 it had reached 33%.
This rapid increase coincided with the reform of the age 16
examinations system in 1988, when the General Certificate
of Secondary Education (GCSE) was introduced. The
GCSE represented something of a departure from the
previous O level/CSE system. It relies on (an often substan-
tial) coursework assessment and a higher proportion of the
16+ age group takes it than was the case with the previous
16+ exams. Moreover, the new exam deliberately moved
away from being a means of separating children into high
and low education streams. Norm-referenced exams, in
by Stephen Machin 
Unto them
that hath...
Since the introduction of GCSE, more children from poorer
backgrounds are staying in school post-16. But, argues 
Stephen Machin, it is middle-class children who have won 
most from the huge expansion of higher education.
which relative performances is what matters, made way for
criterion-referenced assessment in which everyone (at least
in theory) can achieving the top grade.
The effect of the new examination system in stimulating a
rise in staying on rates from the late 1980s is confirmed by
Figure 1: 36% of 17/18 year olds in 1979 to 44% by
1988. Then the 1990s saw a step change. By 2001 the
staying on rate was up to 73%.
Income inequality for families with children has also risen
rapidly since the late 1970s. Figure 2 shows the evolution
over time of the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the log
real income distribution, where each percentile is indexed
to 1 in 1968. After not much change in the 1970s, we see
the now familiar pattern of no real income growth at the
10th percentile for most of the post-1979 period. Only
from the mid-1990s does the 10th percentile’s income
start to grow in real terms. On the other hand, there is
significant growth (of over 40%) at the median and
substantial growth (of over 75%) at the 90th percentile. 
Part of this rise in income inequality has reflected itself in a
sharp increase in child poverty. For example, calculations
based on the FES show that around one in twelve children
lived in families with income below half of the national
average in 1968. By the late 1990s this measure of child
poverty had rocketed to around one in three.
These patterns make any education/income links all the more
important. First, as income gaps have widened, any positive
link between education and income will disproportionately
benefit children from richer families and disadvantage
children from poorer families. Second, any strengthening of
the connections between education and family income will
exacerbate any such rich/poor differences. 
Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg and I have investigated how the
links between education and family income have altered
through time in the UK (Blanden, Gregg and Machin,
2002). Because of real difficulties with almost all UK data
sources in matching children who have left home with the
income of their parents, our research follows two main
routes. The first is to focus on children’s decision as to
staying in education after the compulsory school leaving
age, because most children at this point are still living in the
family home and can, therefore, be linked to their parents’
income. The second is to use the rich cohort and longitu-
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Figure 1. Trends in post-compulsory educational
participation (%)
Age participation index
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Figure 2. Changes in the distribution of (log) real income
for UK families with children
90th Percentile (indexed)
50th Percentile (Indexed)
10th Percentile (indexed)
Notes: Own calculations from Family Expenditure Surveys of 1968 through
2000, in Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2002). Sample is all non-pensioner
families with children.
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Staying on rates from Family Expenditure Survey cohort of 17/18 year olds
still in full-time education. Source: own calculations, in Blanden, Gregg and
Machin (2002). Age participation index is the number of young (under 21)
home initial entrants expressed as a proportion of the averaged 18 to 19
year old population. Source: DfES.
dinal data that follows individuals over time, thereby allow-
ing one to match individuals with their parents’ income.
Table 1 shows the percentage of 17 to 18 year olds who
stayed on after the minimum school leaving age between
1979 and 2000. It breaks down staying on rates across the
parental income distribution, showing the percentage for
each quintile in each time period.
The Table makes it clear that the staying on rate is consid-
erably higher for children from the upper part of the income
distribution. For example, between 1979 and 1981 54% of
children with parents in the upper fifth of the income distri-
bution stayed on at school, compared with 29% from the
bottom fifth. Even by the last period, 1997 to 1999, a strong
income related gap remained, with 85% of the highest
quintile children staying on, compared with 61% of the
lowest quintile children.
But these broad comparisons conceal an interesting pattern
across time, which splits itself into two clear periods. Before
the introduction of GCSE the income gaps in staying on
rates actually widened, with a 15 percentage point increase
in staying on rates between 1979-81 and 1988-90 for the
highest income quintile and a meagre 4 percentage point
rise for the lower quintile. After the GCSE reform the staying
on rate increases much faster at the bottom. 
One might think that a reform that turned around the income
gaps in staying on rates also had the potential to affect
higher education participation rates as well. Here, however,
the picture is bleaker. Table 2 shows higher education
participation by income quintiles at three points in time: the
late 1970s, the late 1980s and the late 1990s.
The table shows that children of higher income parents
7
Table 1. Staying on rates by income quintiles (%)
Parental income quintiles
lowest 2nd lowest middle 2nd highest highest
1979-1981 29 31 35 42 54
1982-1984 34 37 36 48 57
1985-1987 33 38 40 48 62
1988-1990 31 40 45 49 69
1991-1993 44 56 52 57 73
1994-1996 61 65 61 72 84
1997-1999 61 70 70 76 85
Change 1979-1981 to 1988-1990 2 9 10 7 15
Change 1988-1990 to 1997-1999 30 30 25 27 16
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GCSE
represented
something of a
departure
Source: own calculations from Family Expenditure Survey data Family Expenditure Survey
cohort of 17/18 year olds studied in Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2002).
improved their HE participation substantially in the 1980s.
There was then little change across the income spectrum
through the 1990s. In fact, the three middle quintiles seem
to improve their position by more than the top quintile during
the 1990s and the top quintile itself did better than the
bottom. There was certainly no reversal of trends compara-
ble with that seen over time in school staying on rates. 
So it is clear that educational inequality – the link between
family income and post-16 education – has tended to rise in
recent years. These patterns are confirmed in the more
detailed statistical analysis in Blanden, Gregg and Machin
(2002), which controls for factors that are correlated with
both parental income and education participation. A feature
of that statistical work is the conclusion that the stage of the
education process is important. While the introduction of
the GCSE system ameliorated rising income gaps related
to school staying on rates, no such process has permeated
into higher education. In fact, university participation has
become more strongly connected to parental income. Even
the sharp expansion of university participation of the 1990s
did not benefit poorer children. If anything, it strengthened
the position of the middle classes.
The same story is borne out if one considers recent trends
in higher education participation by social class. Table 3
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Table 2. Higher education participation by income quintiles (%)
Parental income quintiles
lowest 2nd lowest middle 2nd highest highest
1977 – NCDS 9 10 12 14 27
1989 - BCS 10 14 16 24 38
1997 - BHPS (Ave) 15 26 24 34 46
Change 1977 to 1989 1 4 4 10 11
Change 1989 to 1997 5 12 8 10 8
Source: own calculations from National Child Development Study (NCDS), British Cohort
Study (BCS) and British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data on people aged 19, studied
in Blanden, Gregg and Machin (2002).
Table 3. Higher education participation and social class in the 1990s (%)
1991-92 1998-99 Change 1991-92 
to 1998-99
Professional 55 72 17
Intermediate 36 45 9
Skilled non-manual 22 29 7
Skilled manual 11 18 7
Partly skilled 12 17 5
Unskilled 6 13 7
All social classes 23 31 8
Source: Glennerster (2001), Table 11.
Educational inequality has tended to
rise in recent years
reproduces some of Glennerster’s (2001) analysis of Social
Trends data to show no differential improvement for the
lower social classes in the link between higher education
participation and social class. There has been an actual
worsening in absolute percentage points, despite the rapid
increase in enrollment seen in the 1990s.
These patterns have clear ramifications for future inequality,
both within and across generations. We know that gradu-
ates subsequently get paid more. If more children from
relatively rich backgrounds get degrees, this will generate
increased links between people’s income and that of their
parents, thereby reducing intergenerational mobility (see
Blanden et al, 2001). This does not seem to be a desirable
outcome. Similarly, within generations, there are likely to be
productivity implications of university education being linked
more closely to parental income. It seems inevitable that this
will result in higher ability children from poor backgrounds
missing out (and lower ability children from rich
backgrounds “getting lucky”). 
There are also implications for the currently “hot” issue of
higher education financing. Unless accompanied by
substantial and generous scholarships for lower income
children, the proposals to introduce top-up fees seem
bound to reinforce educational inequalities. It seems clear,
in fact, that measures to reduce the problems that financial
poverty generates for access to higher education are
needed. As Nicholas Barr convincingly argues:
“Scholarships – such as higher education maintenance
allowances – are vital. So are financial incentives for univer-
sities to widen participation.” (Barr (2002)) If one is
concerned about educational inequality and its wider impact
on society and the future performance of the economy, then
it seems that these kinds of reforms of HE financing are
important – more important probably than the government
policy target of 50% participation by 2010.
Stephen Machin is a member of the CEP, Director of the DfES
Centre for the Economics of Education and Professor of
Economics at University College London.
This article draws heavily on research done jointly with Jo Blanden
and Paul Gregg.
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by Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell 
Full employment
is not just 
a dream
Europe’s leaders have pledged themselves to ambitious targets for
employment by 2010. Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell here
present them with a manifesto for how it can be achieved.
In Europe unemployment is too high and employment istoo low. Over 71/2% of Europe’s workforce is unemployedand only two thirds of people aged 15 to 64 are in work. 
At their Lisbon summit in 2000 the EU heads of government
set the target that by 2010 the employment rate should rise
from 64% to at least 70%. For older workers, aged
between 55 and 64, the employment rate should rise from
38% to at least 50%.
These are ambitious targets. They will require two big
changes: more people must seek work and, among those
seeking work, a higher proportion must get a job. So we
need higher participation and (for full employment) we need
a much lower unemployment rate.
Can it be done? A mere glance at the experience of differ-
ent European countries shows that it can. As Table 1
shows, four EU countries already exceed the overall target
for 2010 (Britain, Denmark, The Netherlands and Sweden).
And eight of the 15 countries in the EU already have lower
unemployment than the United States (the previous four,
plus Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal). 
So there is no such thing as “the European unemployment
problem”. The fundamental problem is high unemployment
in four of the five large countries: France, Germany, Italy
and Spain. If high overall unemployment in Europe is to be
reduced, these large countries will have to learn what they
can from the experience of the rest of Europe. At the same
time, no European country can be satisfied with its current
performance. In every country unemployment is higher than
in the 1960s and the participation rate (especially among
older workers) is unsustainably low. 
Many people doubt whether more jobs will result if more
people look for work. Indeed, some believe that the only
way to reduce unemployment is to reduce the number of
people looking for work – for example through early retire-
ment. This “lump of labour” fallacy is a profound error and,
unless people understand the process of job creation, there
is no chance of our hitting Europe’s employment target.
At any particular moment, the number of jobs is determined
by the amount people want to buy – that is by aggregate
demand. Aggregate demand is influenced by many factors,
mostly outside the direct control of policy makers. However,
monetary policy, in particular, is very important. In a reces-
sion, aggregate demand is low and this is reflected in
higher levels of unemployment. Monetary policy is then
generally loosened in order to stimulate aggregate demand.
As the economy recovers, at some stage it runs into labour
shortages and inflationary pressure. In anticipation of rising
inflation, monetary policy is then generally tightened. There
is an unemployment problem if, at this point, unemployment
is still high.
The key issue is how much unemployment remains when
labour shortages become excessive and inflation therefore
starts rising. This is known as the non-accelerating-inflation
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). It is, if you like, the sustain-
able rate of unemployment and, if there is no trend in infla-
tion up or down, it will also be the average rate of
unemployment over a run of years. 
This rate of unemployment differs greatly between countries
and over time. It depends on the institutions and policies
existing at the time. It is these factors that determine the
average unemployment rate. In other words, they determine
CentrePiece Winter 2003 11
Table 1. Unemployment rates and employment/
population ratios (%)
Unemployment Employment/
rate* Population**
aged 15-64 aged 55-64
Austria 4.0 68 27
Belgium 6.8 60 25
Denmark 4.2 76 57
Finland 9.1 68 46
France 9.2 62 37
Germany 8.1 66 37
Greece 7.3 56 38
Ireland 4.4 65 47
Italy 9.0 55 19
Luxembourg 2.4 63 25
Netherlands 2.6 74 39
Portugal 4.4 69 50
Spain 11.3 59 39
Sweden 5.3 75 67
UK 5.2 71 52
EU 7.5 64 39
EU Target (2010) 70 50
USA 6.0 73 58
Japan 5.2 69 62
*  April 2002 
** 2001
Source: HM Treasury Pocket Databank, 31 July 2002; OECD Employment
Outlook, July 2002 (pages 304-9).
how many jobs there will be for a given total labour force.
At all times the number of jobs will depend on aggregate
demand. But, because of the inflation constraint, aggregate
demand will be restricted by the amount of available labour.
So, over a run of years, the number of jobs will ultimately
depend on the available supply of those who are ready and
willing to take up jobs. This proposition is crucial and many
of the mistakes in employment policy come from a failure to
understand it. 
If you think of the changes in employment and labour supply
over the centuries, it is quite obvious how wrong it is. There
is further strong evidence from the recent past. As Figure 1
shows, the supply of labour has grown at hugely different
rates in different countries. But the number of jobs in each
country has grown more or less in line with the growth in
labour supply. 
Countries also differ in their levels of labour force participa-
tion. If the “lump of labour” theory were true, one might
expect those with lower labour force participation rates to
have lower unemployment. But, as Figure 2 shows, this is
not so. If anything, it is the other way round. One might also
expect that the countries that had lowered their participation
rate most would have also lowered their unemployment
most. Again, as Figure 3 shows, this is not so. 
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Figure 1. % growth in the labour force and employment
1960-2000
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1979-1999 (pages 11- 13); European Economy, 73, 2001 (pages 274-5)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 2002 (pages 208-9)
There is no such thing as ‘the European employment problem’
Figure 4. Long-term unemployment and the 
duration of benefits
Source: Benefit duration is from Nickell and Layard in Ashenfelter and Card
(eds), Handbook of Labor Economics Vol. 3 and relates to 1992. LTU data
are from OECD Employment Trends and relate to 1989-98.
% of unemployed people out of work for 
over 12 months, 1989-98
M
ax
im
um
 d
ur
at
io
n 
of
 b
en
ef
its
 (
ye
ar
s)
 1
99
2
So the starting point is that, if we increase the supply of
labour, we shall increase employment. This has two impli-
cations. First, we can increase employment by increasing
labour force participation (for example, that of single
mothers or older people). Second, we can increase
employment by increasing the effective supply of 
labour from people who are already searching for 
work unsuccessfully. 
The key evidence concerns the relation between
unemployment and vacancies. When vacancies are high,
unemployment should be relatively low – because it is easy
for unemployed people to find work. Yet, strikingly, in
France, West Germany, Belgium and Spain vacancies in
recent years have been extremely high by historical
standards, despite high unemployment. (No vacancy data
are available for Italy.) It is this high level of vacancies that
helped to generate increasing European inflation in
2000/1, which led to higher interest rates and the end of
the European recovery. 
In all these four countries vacancies in 2000/1 were far
higher than in 1975. One would, therefore, expect that
unemployment would have been lower than in 1975. But in
fact it was more than double (except in Belgium). The main
upward shift of unemployment relative to vacancies
occurred in the 1980s. During that period a similar shift
occurred in almost every European country. But in Britain,
Denmark, and The Netherlands something different then
occurred in the 1990s. Unemployment fell back close to its
level in 1975. This reflected a structural shift, since vacan-
cies did not rise compared with 1990 – if anything the
reverse. So in these three countries the unemployed
became much more effective at filling vacancies, while in
France, Germany, Belgium and Spain they did not. Why
was this? 
There is no evidence of any major change in the mismatch
between the characteristics of the unemployed and the
characteristics of the jobs available in any of the countries
we are discussing. So the change must have been a
change in the matching process – in how unemployed
people are treated. 
Even in the 1980s it was evident that unemployment differ-
ences between countries were influenced by how
unemployed people were treated. It was striking that the
United States had virtually no long-term unemployment
(defined as a duration of over a year), while Europe had
almost as many long-term unemployed as short-term
employed. The most obvious explanation was the long-
duration unemployment benefits that existed in Europe but
not the US. This relationship is depicted crudely in Figure 4.
The duration and level of benefits are one set of factors
influencing unemployment. But even more important is the
help that unemployed people get in finding work and the
conditions that apply to the receipt of benefit. These two
factors, active labour market policy and benefit conditional-
ity, work best in conjunction with each other.
Clearly, one way to reduce long-term dependence on
benefits is to make sure that they are used for their intended
purpose – to support people who are not working and who
really cannot find work. In other words, the right to benefits
must be matched by an obligation to get a job, if jobs exist.
There must be a “test of willingness to work”.
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The ‘lump of labour fallacy’ is a profound error
As a recent OECD conference revealed*, countries differ
amazingly in the framework within which benefits are
dispensed. Experience shows that unemployed people are
more available to fill employers’ vacancies, if
(i) benefits are paid through the same office as that where
people are placed in work;
(ii) unemployed people have to attend regularly in person;
and
(iii)unemployed people are expected after a period to be
available for most types of work, even if this involves
substantial journey times or even (as in a few countries)
moving home with the help of a subsidy.
The problem with imposing strict availability conditions is
that these are difficult to apply unless the employment
service is extremely active in helping people to get offers of
work. So a “stricter benefit regime” to reduce “passive”
dependence on benefits only makes sense if linked to an
“active” labour market policy to help people back into work.
The two should be complementary. 
This is the policy known as “welfare-to-work”. The phrase
comes from America, where it mainly applies to lone
mothers. But the practice as applied to unemployed people
has been mainly developed in Europe. Denmark, The
Netherlands and Britain all introduced major welfare-to-
work policies in the 1990s. And in the last year or two
France, Germany and Spain have taken more limited steps
towards greater conditionality.
In labour market policy there has to be an especial focus on
preventing long-term unemployment, since it is so destruc-
tive. This means ensuring that everyone gets offers of work
or training within a year or so of becoming unemployed, as
required by the EU Luxembourg Guidelines. Britain,
Denmark and The Netherlands do this for young people, but
only Denmark and The Netherlands do it for people of all
ages. The aim must if possible be to channel offers of work
from regular employers, mainly in the private sector. But, to
prevent long-term dependence on benefits, we need to
ensure some worthwhile activity for everyone. It must be
actively aimed at employability, so that, when we cannot
secure a regular job, we should offer meaningful work with
NGOs or socially useful projects. The measure of success
is the numbers who get regular work and keep it.
Welfare-to-work must involve the principle of
mutual obligation. The state has an obligation to
ensure that offers of work are channelled to every
unemployed person within a reasonable time after
becoming unemployed. But in return the citizen
should take advantage of those offers, or lose some or
all of their benefit if they do not do so, unless there are
medical reasons to the contrary. The Luxembourg
Guidelines should be extended to include this.
As always, there is the issue of whether such policies can
really expand employment. Many doubt whether active
labour market measures can work owing to “displacement”
and “substitution”. In extreme form, these fears derive from
the “lump-of-labour” fallacy: if the number of jobs is fixed
and we enable Mr X to get one of them, then some other
person must by definition go without work.
Evidence on substitution and replacement is by its nature
difficult to obtain. In the past it has been mainly got by
asking questions to employers. When a subsidy is evalu-
ated, employers are often asked: 1. How many of those
hired would you have hired anyway? (“Deadweight”); 2.
How many of the jobs would have been filled by other
recruits in any case? (“Substitution”); 3. How many of the
new subsidised jobs represent an increase in your own
employment at the expense of your competitors?
(“Displacement”). The measure of net job creation resulting
from the subsidy is then said to be the total number of
subsidised jobs minus 1, 2 and 3. 
Until recently this procedure has been used almost univer-
sally and often implies that net job creation is only 20% of
the total number of jobs subsidised. Yet these estimates of
substitution and deadweight are based on a theory of the
labour market that is never used for any other purpose.
The theory being used is that, if somebody would have been
employed in one place and that opportunity closes down,
then unemployment increases permanently – by that
amount. This makes no allowance for the possibility that
people who find one channel of employment blocked will
find another channel. The procedure is especially extraordi-
nary when one considers that typically half the people
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The key concerns the relation between unemployment and vacancies
*See Labour Market Policies and the Public Employment Service, OECD 2001.] 
supposedly sent into unemployment by the process of
substitution are people who already have a job and would
have simply been changing jobs.
Only recently have economists began to realise that the old
assumptions about substitution are invalid. Lawrence Katz
of Harvard University, for example, has insisted on a more
rational analysis of the main US wage subsidy programme
for youth, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit. Until 1988 it
covered disadvantaged young people aged between 18
and 24, but from then onwards it ceased to apply to people
aged 23 and 24. This change provided a good controlled
experiment, enabling one to isolate the effects of the
subsidy previously on the employment of 23 and 24 year
olds. His conclusion was 40-52% of the subsidised jobs
had represented net additions to employment.
Interestingly, evaluations of more intensive job search assis-
tance have never suffered from the problems discussed
above. They have generally shown good value for money.
These can have the added advantage that extra effort is
easily focussed on those who really need it. This is an
important element in any active labour market policy and
helps to reduce “deadweight”.
One further point on unemployed people. Throughout
Europe, ethnic minorities are a growing proportion of the
labour force and their unemployment rates are usually much
higher than the average. Ethnic minorities need especial
help and the same principle applies to them as to all
citizens: the principle of rights and responsibilities. They,
more than most, need the right to offers of work or training
but they also have the responsibility to master the language
of their adopted country and to use the offers that are avail-
able to them.
Moving on to older workers and mothers, there are two
issues that these two groups share in common. First, there
is the issue of distortions. Those not working may for that
reason be receiving state benefits, in which case there is a
cost to the rest of society and, therefore, a possibility that
incentives are inefficiently distorted away from work.
Second, there is the issue, arising from higher longevity and
lower birth rates, that we need to increase the numbers in
work in order to pay for the growing numbers of dependent
elderly. That said, the reasons for non-participation are very
different for older people and for single mothers – and so
are the policies needed to increase participation.
Among older people (aged 55 to 64) only 42% are in the
labour force and only 38% are working – making an
unemployment rate of 8%, the same as the overall rate.
This highly unsatisfactory situation is very similar to what it
was ten years ago. To find out what is causing it, we can
learn a lot from the huge differences in participation rates
and employment rates across countries (see Table 1) and
their time series variation. There are a number of key
explanatory factors. 
The first is the standard age of retirement at which state
benefits become payable. The second is the use of
unemployment benefits as a form of early retirement benefit,
with none of the usual job search conditions attached. And
the third is the availability of invalidity benefits, often not
properly monitored to see whether the person still suffers
from the problem they had when they first went on to
benefit. (Some 15% of all men aged between 55 and 64
are on invalidity benefit in Britain, Germany and Italy and
25% in The Netherlands.) To achieve higher participation of
older workers will require changes in all of these practices,
but especially in the standard age of requirement.
But there must also be wider changes in society’s attitudes
and approaches to older people. By 2006 at the latest every
European country must have introduced laws against age
discrimination in employment. But this will only succeed if at
the same time older workers become genuinely more
attractive to employers through progressive updating of
skills, either by workplace learning or independent study.
Continuous learning and adequate job mobility in middle
age are important to prevent workers become burned out or
bored before their natural working life is over. 
Among people of working age, mothers are the other main
group who are often not working. The number of non-
working mothers is falling rapidly, but must continue to fall if
employment targets are to be met. For policy purposes it is
important to distinguish between those whose choice is
relatively undistorted (married mothers) and those who may
be eligible for state benefits. The single mothers face us
with the more serious problem.
The first issue is the availability and conditionality of income
support from the state. In some countries, like Britain,
support is available without any job search requirement. In
others, job search is required except when the children are
very young. Generally, participation is higher where job
search is required. A second issue is the availability of work
with suitable hours. Where part-time work is readily avail-
able, some mothers who would not otherwise work will
choose to do so. Then there is the question of leave. If a
pregnant mother retains her right to return to her job,
employment rates will be higher. And, finally, there is the
issue of childcare – the more childcare is available, the
more women will work. If Europe wishes to achieve its
employment targets, all these issues will have to be
addressed.
We have focussed so far on the supply side of the market,
but the demand side is also important. If wages are held too
high, employers will not employ the available supply. There
are two issues here. One is the general level of real wages.
At a given level of unemployment, these will be pushed too
high, either if the unemployed are not effectively supplying
their labour, or if there is autonomous wage push, due for
example to union militancy or rises in import prices. Wage
push is only likely in the context of unions and has been
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Countries differ amazingly in their benefits framework
avoided in many of the smaller European countries by
coordinated efforts of employers and unions 
(The Netherlands), or sometimes by the unions on their own
(as at times in Sweden), or by employer solidarity (Portugal).
The second and most serious problem concerns relative
wages, across skills or regions. Unemployment rates are
much higher for unskilled people. One reason for this is a
greater rigidity of wages at the bottom end. However, most
legal minimum wages in Europe are low enough to cause no
problem. Indeed, in some monopsonistic markets they may
even raise employment. The more serious consequences of
wage rigidity occur at the regional level, where overly high
wages are a major cause of unemployment in the former
East Germany, southern Italy and southern Spain.
Experience in the US (and to a degree the UK) suggests that
marked differences in unemployment rates across regions
can be reduced whenever two re-equilibrating factors are at
work. The first is wage adjustment. If unemployment is
higher in one region than another, wages in the high
unemployment region decline vis-à-vis wages in the low-
unemployment region. This attracts investment, which leads
to more jobs in areas of high unemployment. The second re-
equilibrating factor is regional labour mobility: net migration
away from the high-unemployment regions.
In Continental Europe, these two re-equilibrating factors
are often not allowed to operate properly. Centralised
wage-setting institutions deter the emergence of significant
regional wage differentials. At the same time, a number of
factors – including state transfers to the high-unemploy-
ment areas – reduce the pressure to migrate. Thus, large
regional labour market imbalances – the North-South
divide in Italy and Spain or the West-East divide in
Germany – are a prominent feature of the European
landscape. Persistently high unemployment in some
regions is also associated with low participation rates and
a deterioration of the environment in which firms have to
operate. In high-unemployment regions the public sector
tends to pay more than the private sector (at least in terms
of entry wages) and provides more job security. If it is diffi-
cult to get a public sector job when already employed in
the private sector, this encourages “wait unemployment”,
where people (sometimes the most educated people)
queue for public sector jobs to become vacant. 
In order to move these regions away from the high
unemployment/low participation equilibria in which they are
trapped, it is necessary to act on both the demand and the
supply side. On the demand side, it is necessary to pursue
greater decentralisation in collective bargaining; wages
should be allowed to vary across regions so as to reflect
more closely the differences in labour productivity and the
cost of living. Decentralisation in pay determination should
extend to the public administration and be accompanied by
the introduction of incentives for higher productivity and
hiring procedures that discourage queuing. 
On the supply side, the task is to bring welfare-to-work
principles into the cash transfers provided to non-employed
individuals in these regions. A key requirement here is to
have unemployment benefits, rather than other instruments
(like early retirement and invalidity pensions) that merely
encourage non-participation in the labour market rather than
supporting job search. Welfare-to-work should encourage
regional labour mobility, but should circulate information on
jobs available in more buoyant labour markets and
sometimes also subsidise moving costs. Regional mobility
should not necessarily involve long-range migration, as
there are often areas within the high unemployment regions
that are more dynamic.
Finally, there is the thorny issue of employment protection.
In public rhetoric it is common to attribute high European
unemployment to high employment protection. But in fact
employment protection is especially high in some
European countries (like Portugal, Sweden, Norway and
The Netherlands) where unemployment is well below the
US level. The bulk of the economic evidence suggests that
employment protection raises long-term unemployment (by
reducing hiring), reduces short-term employment (by
reducing firing) and has no clear effect on total employ-
ment. But specific policies to prevent the closure of enter-
prises are inefficient.
The main danger of employment protection is that it
strengthens the hand of workers in wage bargaining,
leading to excessive wage pressure even when unemploy-
ment is high. Any effort to reduce employment protection
should have this issue firmly in view. Unfortunately, the
famous Spanish labour market reform of 1984 did not. It
introduced temporary employment contracts, while actually
increasing the security of the insiders who were already
employed. As a result, there was no reduction in wage
pressure. All efforts aimed at creating a dual labour market
are likely to fail in exactly the same way as the original
Spanish reform.
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40-52% of subsidised jobs represent net additions
Our conclusion is that what really matter are:
for unemployment
n how unemployed people are treated
n regional wage flexibility
for the employment of older workers
n reduced subsidies to inactivity, used if necessary to
finance employment subsidies
n lifelong learning
n an older official retirement age, where appropriate
n anti-discrimination legislation
for single mothers
n reduced subsidies to inactivity
n more child-care help
n more opportunities to work part-time
Full employment is not an unattainable dream. We can elimi-
nate long-term unemployment and ensure that all who want
work can find it within a reasonable time. The principles to
achieve this aim cannot usefully be summarised as simply a
need for “more labour market flexibility”. In many cases
what is needed is more activism and even, sometimes,
more regulation. 
We must stop pretending that “more flexibility” is the
answer to all our employment problems. What is required is
a clear focus on the three main issues that will make a
difference: the treatment of the unemployed, the flexibility of
wages and the treatment of older workers.
Richard Layard is Co-Director of the CEP.
Stephen Nickell is a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee and a member of the CEP.
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by Stephen Redding and Anthony Venables
Why has globalisation brought such large increases in exports to
some countries and not to others? Stephen Redding and
Anthony Venables look at the way internal geography and
domestic institutions seem to be a large part of the answer.
Yawning
gaps
T
here have been wide variations in countries’
export performance over the last quarter century.
South-East Asian countries have seen their real
exports increase by more than 800% since the
early 1970s, while those of sub-Saharan Africa
have increased by just 70%.
This has raised concerns that, while some countries are
benefiting from globalisation, others are at best passed by.
We have investigated some of the determinants of these
divergent export performances, looking in particular at the
roles of external and internal geography.
Geography might be expected to affect export performance
in several ways. One is that the strength of international
demand linkages varies between countries. Countries in
South-East Asia have been at the centre of a fast growing
region, which has created rising import demand. Given all
we know about the importance of distance as a barrier to
trade, the export opportunities created by these growing
demands are likely to be geographically concentrated,
creating spillover effects between countries in the region.
We have developed a theoretical model of bilateral trade
flows, using gravity techniques to estimate the model’s
parameters. This enables us to break down each country’s
actual export growth into two parts. One is based on a
country’s location relative to sources of import demands,
which we call its “foreign market access”. The other is
linked to changes within the country, which we call its
“supply capacity”. We find that a substantial part of the
differential export growth of various countries and regions
since 1970 can be attributed to variations in the rate at
which their foreign market access has grown.
Changes in one country’s foreign market access arise from
changes in aggregate import demand from other countries
– particularly those that are geographically close. There may
also be particular effects arising, for example, from regional
integration agreements. We, therefore, refined our model to
allow the ease of trading within regions to differ from that
between regions. Such intra-regional effects are positive for
Europe and negative for sub-Saharan Africa. Also, they
have increased significantly over time in North America and
Latin America. 
In order to investigate the determinants of each country’s
supply capacity, we developed a simple theoretical frame-
work within which supply capacity depends in equilibrium
on a country’s internal geography, its business environment
(such as institutional quality) and its foreign market access.
All three characteristics turn out to be statistically significant
and quantitatively important determinants of export perform-
ance. For example, almost all of sub-Saharan Africa’s poor
export performance can be accounted for by poor perform-
ance under each heading. (The theoretical model that we
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developed and use here is described in full in our
Discussion Paper No. 549.)
A key feature of theoretical models of product differentiation
and trade costs is the existence of a pecuniary demand
spillover across countries. An increase in expenditure on
traded goods in one country raises demand for traded
goods in other countries and, because of trade costs, this
effect is greater for neighbouring countries than for distant
ones. This implies that growing import demand in other
countries will be an important source of export growth as
well as domestic supply-side considerations. We begin by
investigating the relative importance of these two sets of
considerations.
Data on the value of bilateral trade flows for 101 countries
between 1970 and 1997 are obtained from the NBER
World Trade Database (Feenstra et al., 1997; Feenstra,
2001). The US GDP deflator has been applied to these
current dollar data to obtain a measure of trade flows in real
terms. We combined the trade data with information on
geographical characteristics (eg bilateral distance, or
existence of a common border) and with data on GDP and
population from the World Bank. (See Appendix A of
DP549 for further details.) We are concerned here with the
long run determinants of real export growth. Therefore, in
order to smooth year-on-year fluctuations which may be
substantial for small countries, we have averaged bilateral
trade flows over four-year periods. With 28 years of data,
this yields seven periods for analysis.
The results of our estimations for all 101 countries are
shown in the Appendix to DP549. Here, in order to
provide a broader overview of the sources of export
growth, we aggregate the results for nine geographi-
cal regions: North America; Latin America; Western
Europe; Eastern Europe; Sub-Saharan Africa;
South-East Asia; “Other” Asia; Oceania; and Middle
East and North Africa. A region’s foreign market
access (FMA) and supplier capacity are the sum of the
values for all countries within the region.
The upper two panels of Figure 1 show the evolution of
FMA for the first eight of these regions, while the lower
two panels show changes in supplier capacity. To control
for regions having different numbers of countries, the
figure graphs average rather than total values. To clarify
changes over time, we normalize supplier capacity so that
it is expressed relative to its initial value. The results for
Middle-East and North Africa are dominated by oil exports
and are, therefore, omitted from the figure.
The initial ranking by regions has Eastern and Western
Europe with the highest level of FMA. (This high position for
Eastern European is not as surprising as it might seem,
because the FMA estimate measures where countries are
relative to world import demands.) At the bottom of this
initial ranking is Oceania. The most striking feature of the
12
1.5
1
2  5 
time trend shown in Figure 1 is the rapid growth in FMA for
South-East Asia and the acceleration of “other Asia” in the
second period. 
Since the observed growth of exports is to be explained by
the combination of foreign market access and increase in
supply capacity, identifying the size of the FMA factor
reveals the extent to which a country’s export growth has
been due to its improved internal supply performance rather
than changes in external conditions. Table 1 examines
growth rates of FMA and supplier capacity in further detail
for all nine regions (Again, the results for all 101 countries
can be found in DP549.) The “benchmark” at the top of the
table shows the growth rates in the indicated periods of
overall world exports and displays hypothetical values for
the growth of foreign market access and supply capacity
that would be observed if all countries had an identical
export performance. 
A number of results stand out. South-East Asian countries
experienced much faster export growth than the bench-
mark in both the first and second halves of the period
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Export opportunities created by growing import demands are likely to be geographically concentrated
NorthAmerica
Latin America
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
South East Asia
Other Asia
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Table 1. Regional sources of export growth, 1970/73 -
1994/97
% rates of growth
Region Period Exports Foreign Supplier
Market Capacity
Access
Benchmark Periods 1-7 
(1970/73-1994/97) 326.3 106.5 106.5
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 104.4 42.9 42.9
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 108.5 44.5 44.5
North Periods 1-7 
America (1970/73-1994/97) 289.0 166.1 110.9
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 92.7 59.4 54.0
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 101.8 66.9 36.9
Latin Periods 1-7 
America (1970/73-1994/97) 193.3 110.8 48.1
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 90.2 40.4 43.5
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 54.2 50.2 3.3
Western Periods 1-7 
Europe (1970/73-1994/97) 269.4 94.3 96.8
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 75.1 33.0 34.1
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 111.0 46.1 46.8
Eastern Periods 1-7 
Europe (1970/73-1994/97) 187.4 94.8 39.6
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 44.0 34.0 11.0
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 99.6 45.5 25.8
Region Period Exports Foreign Supplier
Market Capacity
Access
Sub-Saharan Periods 1-7 
Africa (1970/73-1994/97) 70.4 86.4 -7.2
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 54.2 34.7 10.8
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 10.5 38.4 -16.3
N Africa/ Periods 1-7 
Middle East (1970/73-1994/97) 189.8 102.8 41.2
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 245.5 48.4 135.7
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) -16.1 36.7 -40.1
SE Asia Periods 1-7 
(1970/73-1994/97) 826.2 146.4 238.0
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 233.7 47.9 119.0
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 177.6 66.6 54.4
Other Asia Periods 1-7 
(1970/73-1994/97) 372.0 117.8 119.3
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 76.5 45.7 21.0
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 167.5 49.4 81.2
Oceania Periods 1-7 
(1970/73-1994/97) 166.8 104.3 29.9
Periods 1-4 
(1970/73-1982/85) 48.4 37.3 7.9
Periods 4-7 
(1982/85-1994/97) 79.9 48.8 20.4
under study. In the first half this was driven particularly by
supply capacity growth. In the second, FMA growth
became relatively more important. The full results show
that, for most countries in this region, FMA growth was
generally faster in the first half than in the second. For
some of the earlier developers (eg Japan, Taiwan and
South Korea), supply capacity growth slowed sharply in
the second half, while the later developers (eg Philippines,
Thailand, Vietnam) experienced a dramatic increase in
supply capacity growth in the second half. 
The rest of Asia experienced below average export growth
in the first half of the period, but this was accounted for by
much slower than average supply capacity growth, which
more than offset faster than average market access growth.
This was in sharp contrast to the second half of the period,
when close to average market access growth was associ-
ated with supply capacity growth at twice the benchmark
rate, giving export growth nearly twice the overall level. 
Latin America shows a different picture. A close to bench-
mark rate of market access growth in both the earlier and
later periods was associated with a close to benchmark
supply capacity growth in the first and weak supply capac-
ity growth in the second. Results for the Middle East and
North Africa are again dominated by oil exports. For sub-
Saharan Africa, taking the whole period together, the
contribution of FMA to export growth was nearly 20
percentage points below the benchmark. This suggests
that geographical location was important in explaining the
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Table 3. % contributions of partner regions to the growth of foreign market access of each
exporting region: Periods 1-4 (1970/73-1994/7)
North America 59.4 51.6 0.4 2.4 -0.1 -0.2 1.8 3.2 0.3 0.2
Latin America 40.4 27.9 1.4 3.2 -0.2 -0.5 3.1 4.7 0.4 0.4
Western Europe 33.0 7.4 0.0 18.1 -0.3 -0.2 4.2 3.2 0.4 0.1
Eastern Europe 34.0 6.8 -0.0 18.3 -0.4 -0.2 5.2 3.6 0.5 0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 34.7 12.6 -0.1 6.2 -0.3 -1.0 8.6 7.2 1.1 0.4
N Africa/M East 48.4 9.5 -0.0 10.3 -0.2 -0.3 2.1 6.5 1.4 0.3
SE Asia 47.9 8.5 -0.1 2.9 -0.2 -0.5 4.8 30.2 1.4 0.9
Other Asia 45.7 9.6 -0.1 4.8 -0.3 -0.6 10.7 16.9 4.1 0.6
Oceania 37.3 13.1 -0.2 2.3 -0.2 -0.8 4.5 15.3 1.0 2.4
Table 4. % contributions of partner regions to the growth of foreign market access of each
exporting region: Periods 4-7 (1982/85-1994/97)
North America 67.0 56.4 1.8 4.5 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 4.1 0.1 0.3
Latin America 50.2 22.2 12.8 7.7 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 7.3 0.1 0.5
Western Europe 46.1 6.1 1.1 33.0 1.7 -0.3 -1.0 5.2 0.1 0.2
Eastern Europe 45.5 5.7 1.1 31.7 2.5 -0.3 -1.2 5.7 0.1 0.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 38.4 10.9 3.4 13.1 0.8 -1.1 -1.9 12.3 0.2 0.7
N Africa/M East 36.7 7.3 1.6 15.3 0.9 -0.5 1.9 9.6 0.2 0.4
SE Asia 66.6 7.1 1.6 6.9 0.4 -0.2 -1.0 50.4 0.3 1.0
Other Asia 49.4 8.0 1.8 10.0 0.7 -0.3 -2.1 28.5 2.0 0.8
Oceania 48.8 12.3 3.9 7.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 22.8 0.2 2.2
Note for Tables 2, 3, 4:
A region’s foreign market
access (FMA) is the sum of
the values of FMA for all
countries within that region.
The exporting region is
shown in the rows of the
table and the importing
partner in the columns.
Table 2. % contributions of partner regions to the growth of foreign market access 
of each exporting region: Periods 1-7 (1970/73-1994/7)
North America 166.1 141.4 3.2 9.5 0.3 -0.4 1.3 9.8 0.3 0.6
Latin America 110.8 59.1 19.3 14.0 0.4 -0.9 2.2 14.9 0.6 1.2
Western Europe 94.3 15.5 1.5 62.0 2.0 -0.5 2.9 10.2 0.5 0.4
Eastern Europe 94.8 14.4 1.4 60.7 3.0 -0.6 3.7 11.2 0.6 0.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 86.4 27.2 4.6 23.8 0.8 -2.4 6.0 23.8 1.4 1.3
N Africa/M East 102.8 20.4 2.4 33.0 1.1 -1.1 23.9 20.7 1.7 0.8
SE Asia 146.4 19.1 2.2 13.0 0.5 -0.7 3.4 104.7 1.9 2.3
Other Asia 117.8 21.3 2.7 19.4 0.7 -1.0 7.7 58.4 7.1 1.7
Oceania 104.3 30.0 5.1 13.2 0.4 -1.0 3.2 46.6 1.3 5.5
region’s poor export performance. However, supply capac-
ity also grew less fast than the benchmark in both halves of
the period and some positive export growth was achieved
in the second half as a result of market access growth
offsetting a significant reduction in supply capacity.
Table 2 looks at each country’s foreign market access
growth, but does not distinguish the sources of this growth
geographically. It would be interesting to know how much
of a country’s FMA growth came from the performance of
other countries in their own region and how much from, say,
a growth in North American market capacity? 
A country’s foreign market access can be divided accord-
ing to geographical regions in which its markets are located
and expressed as the sum of the access to markets in each
region. The results for regional groupings are given in Table
2 for the period as a whole and in Tables 3 and 4 for the two
halves of the period. Reading across the first row of the
tables we see that North America derived virtually all of its
FMA growth from itself. This reflects the fact that Canada’s
FMA is large relative to that of the United States (FMA
captures access to markets other than one’s own) and that
the United States constitutes an extremely large share of
Canada’s FMA. Canada benefits much more from being
located close to the USA than the USA benefits from being
located close to Canada. Thus the “own region” effect
accounts for over 98% of Canada’s total FMA growth. 
Latin America was much more dependent on FMA growth
from outside the region, particularly in the first period. Of
these extra-regional sources, North America was by far the
most important. Western Europe provided the main source
of FMA growth both for itself and for Eastern Europe. The
striking features for sub-Saharan Africa are the negative
contribution of its “own region” effect and the lack of any
dominant external source of FMA growth. 
The Asian figures illustrate two main points. One is the
dominant role of intra-regional linkages with South-East
Asia. The other is the growth in the importance of South-
East Asia for “other Asia”. This reflects partly the general
westward expansion of economic activity in the South-East
Asia region. Table 3 also interestingly indicates South-East
Asia’s growing importance for FMA growth in other
regions, including Africa.
The model that we have been using assumes that trade
frictions between countries are measured simply by
distance and whether or not the countries share a common
border. It is, of course, possible that the costs of trading
within a region differ from those of trading between regions.
So we added dummies to the model for whether two
countries lie within the same geographical region. This
specification allows differences between trade costs on
transactions within a region and those between regions to
be incorporated into the model in a general way that
imposes a minimal degree of structure on the data. We are
also able to analyse changes over time and relate these to
explicit policy attempts at regional integration, including for
example the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA)
and the European Union. 
Over time, we observe a systematic increase in the
estimated values of almost all the “within region” effects.
The proliferation of Regional Preferential Trade Agreements
is clearly having an effect, particularly for North America
(which includes Mexico). At the beginning of our sample
period we found a negative “within region” effect for North
America - perhaps reflecting import substitution in Mexico
or economic activity being more widely dispersed within the
region than captured in our distance measures - but the
estimated coefficient became positive in the period 1990 to
1993, during which NAFTA was signed. However, for
South-East Asia the intra-regional effect diminishes sharply
through time. This does not reflect diminishing intra-regional
trade, but rather the particularly rapid growth of trade with
countries outside the region. 
In Western Europe, we found a systematic rise in the
estimated “within region” effect over time. In Eastern
Europe, its value follows an inverted U-shape, rising
between the 1970s and 1980s (when COMECON policy
was to stimulate trade within the then Soviet bloc) and
declining markedly in the 1990s (following the fall of the
Berlin wall and the abandonment of the COMECON system
of public procurement and trading preferences).
The final stage of the analysis asks what determines a
country’s supply capacity. Intuitively, we should expect it to
depend on a number of underlying characteristics, includ-
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There may be particular effects from regional integration
ing size, endowments and internal geography. It will also
depend, in equilibrium, on foreign market access, since
this is one of the variables that determine the potential
return to exporting. Our theoretical approach is described
in DP549. The model includes variables for the value of
exports, GDP, population and FMA. To represent internal
geography we use the percentage of the population living
within 100 km of the coast or a navigable river. To capture
“institutional quality” we use a widely employed index of the
protection of property rights based on the risk of expropri-
ation. We also include a full set of dummy variables for the
nine regions to control for unobserved heterogeneity
across regions in the determinants of export performance,
including institutional differences, technological features
and regional characteristics. 
To what extent are the divergent performances of the nine
regions explained by this model and which of the independ-
ent variables are driving the performance of different
regions? Our results are shown in Figure 2. The first bar in
each box shows the region’s export performance relative to
the world average after all owing for the effects of country
size. The other four bars sum to this first bar, since they
represent its four components. Bars three to five in each
box show, respectively, the contributions of foreign market
access, internal geography, and institutional quality. The
second bar represents the residual, after controlling for
these factors, ie the regional dummy.
What main points emerge from this analysis? First, North
America (including Mexico) has high trade relative to the
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Figure 2. Regional export performance, 1994-7
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South east Asia Other Asia Oceania
South-East Asian countries experienced much faster export growth
world, given its income and population. This is explained
partly by relatively good market access and partly by its
institutions. This is offset by relatively poor internal geogra-
phy, leaving a substantial unexplained residual. 
Second, Western Europe’s high level of exports is
accounted for by a combination of good market access,
good internal geography and good institutions, leaving virtu-
ally nothing to the residual dummy variable. For Eastern
Europe, the benefits of good market access and better than
average internal geography and institutions are not fully
reflected in the actual level of trade, leaving a large negative
regional dummy. This is consistent with the idea that the
legacy of communism during the post-war period has had a
long-lasting effect on Eastern Europe’s exports, captured
here in the regional dummy.
Third, sub-Saharan Africa has low trade volumes given its
income level. These are accounted for by below average
performance on all three measures, together with some
negative residual. Each of the three factors accounts by
itself for between 20% and 30% of sub-Saharan Africa’s
low overall export growth. Although we are able to explain
some of the above average trade ratios in South-East
Asia, there remains a substantial positive residual that is
likely to be explained in part by the entrepot activities of
Hong Kong and Singapore. Finally, the outcome for
Oceania combines low market access with good internal
geography and institutions.
The changes in countries’ export performance since 1970
is symptomatic, at least, of the extent to which they have
succeeded in benefiting from globalisation. The real value
of world exports doubled between the early 1970s and
mid-1980s and doubled again from the mid-1980s to the
late 1990s. In the second of these periods Latin American
exports went up by just 54%, sub-Saharan Africa’s by
10%, while those of the Middle East and North Africa fell
by 16%. 
We have made some progress in understanding the deter-
minants of cross-country variation in both the levels and
growth of exports. We have confirmed that geography
creates substantial cross-country variations in the ease of
access to foreign markets and is thus an important determi-
nant of export performance. We have shown that a country’s
export performance also depends on its internal geography
and a number of other domestic supply-side factors.
The more we can effectively control for external and internal
geographical factors in analysing comparative export
performance, the better we shall be able to identify the insti-
tutional features that also play a role. Since many of these
are subject to policy control, empirical research in this area
is of the highest importance. 
Stephen Redding is a lecturer in the Economics Department 
of the LSE and a member of the CEP.
Anthony Venables is Research Director of the CEP and
Professor of Economics at the LSE.
This article is based on their paper ÒExplaining Cross-Country
Export Performance: International Linkages and Internal
GeographyÓ, available from the CEP (Discussion Paper No. 549)
or on http://cep.lse.ac.uk 
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nion membership in Britain rose by 4
million between 1950 and 1979. At its
peak in 1979 it stood at 13.2 million, but
haemorrhaged 5.5 million in the subse-
quent two decades (see Table 1).
Presently, union membership is 7.55
million, including some 300,000 self-
employed. Since the Blair government came to power in
1997, the number of unionised employees has been
roughly constant at around the 7.25 million mark, or 29%
of the total.
Density of unionisation depends on demographic, job and
workplace characteristics. It varies little by gender or
ethnic origin, but rises with age up to 50 and falls off
slightly thereafter. Those with higher education have
density levels substantially above those with fewer qualifi-
cations. Teachers, nurses and other professional workers
have the highest of any occupation (48%) and those in
sales jobs the lowest (11%). Density rises sharply by
tenure, a mirror image of the well-known finding that labour
turnover is lower in workplaces, that recognise a union.
Small workplaces (under 25 employees) have density
levels less than half those of larger establishments. People
who work in public administration, education and health
are far more likely to be members than those employed in
business services or hotels and restaurants. In the public
sector, three out of five employees are union members, but
the corresponding figure for the private sector is fewer
than one in five. Manufacturing now has a union density
(27%) below that for the whole economy (29%). And an
individual is more likely to belong to a union if she or he
lives in the northern part of the UK than in south.
by David Metcalf
Unions
past, present
and future
David Metcalf charts the fortunes of the British trade union
movement over the last half-century and suggests where it will 
have to concentrate to find its place in the new economy.
The number and structure of unions has altered dramati-
cally, too. A century ago there were 1,300 unions and at the
end of World War II there were still nearly 800. Mergers,
takeovers and the decline of unions for specific craft
groups, like the Jewish Bakers and Sheffield Wool Sheep
Shearers, has reduced this figure to 226. Indeed, the 11
unions with over 250,000 members each now account for
almost three quarters of total membership. But some small
unions do survive – including the Association of Somerset
Inseminators and the Church and Oswaldwistle Power
Loom Overlookers Society!
Going hand in hand with the decline in union penetration
has been a profound change in the type of mechanisms that
provide employees with a voice – a big switch away from
“representative voice” to “direct voice”. Representative
voice occurs via a recognised trade union or works council.
Direct voice bypasses these intermediate institutions.
Instead, management and employees communicate directly
with one another through, for example, team briefings,
regular meetings between senior management and the
workforce and problem solving groups, such as quality
circles. Between 1984 and 1998, the proportion of
workplaces with only representative voice arrangements
halved, while those relying just on a direct voice arrange-
ments nearly trebled. What happened was that unionised
workplaces added complementary direct communication
systems, while nearly all new workplaces opted for direct
communication methods without recognising unions.
How can this sustained decline of membership in the last
two decades of the twentieth century be explained? There
is no single factor. Rather it was the consequence of inter-
actions between several factors: the composition of the
workforce and jobs; the roles of the state, employers, and
individual workers; and unions' own structures and policies.
It used to be thought that the business cycle also helped
explain membership levels, with persistent unemployment
leading to declining density. But since 1993 unemployment
has fallen continuously and so has density. So this explana-
tion can be ruled out.
Shifts in the composition of the workforce and jobs are one
ingredient. More highly unionised sectors, like cars and
ships or the public sector, and individuals with a greater
likelihood of being a union member (males or full-timers, for
example) now account for a smaller proportion of total
employment. So, as a matter of arithmetic, union member-
ship has also fallen. But it turns out that such “composition”
effects are less important than commonly realised, account-
ing for around a quarter of the fall in membership. The bulk
of any explanation turns on convergence of membership
levels within groups: unionisation of men has fallen to a
similar rate to that of women and some convergence has
also occurred for unionisation rates between full-timers and
part-timers, large and small workplaces, and manufacturing
and non-manufacturing employment.
The state's activities and policies affect union membership
both directly, for example by legislation promoting or under-
mining union security, and indirectly, via its influence on the
environment in which employers and unions operate. In the
1980s and 1990s the environment in which the social
partners conducted their activities was profoundly affected
by the onslaught on public sector activities and greater
emphasis on product market competition. Public sector
unions faced privatisation, compulsory competitive tender-
ing and contracting out. 
Collectivism was damaged in the public sector by taking a
million nurses and teachers out of collective bargaining. In
the private sector it was damaged by the promotion of
company-based payment systems, like profit sharing and
employee share ownership schemes, and by disabling
public protection for the lower paid by abandoning both Fair
Wage Resolutions and wages councils. Product markets
were altered for ever by abandoning state subsidies to
sectors like coal, steel and shipbuilding, and by axing
exchange controls. Less obviously, they were also altered
by policies such as selling rather than allocating commercial
TV franchises and by building the channel tunnel. Each of
these changes had the side effect of rupturing the previous,
sometimes cosy, relationships between capital and labour.
Industrial relations legislation has played a more direct role
in the ebb and flow of membership. In the 1980s legislation
impaired union security by weakening and then outlawing
the closed shop and interfering in check-off arrangements.
The strike threat, a fundamental source of union power, was
weakened by a succession of laws which permitted a union
to be sued, introduced ballots prior to a strike and outlawed
both secondary and unofficial action. This legislation simul-
taneously raised the cost to unions of organising and
reduced the costs to employers of opposing them.
Did employers become more hostile to unions in the 1980s
and 1990s? There is no evidence that union activity – the
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Table 1. Trade union membership and density, UK
Membership Density
(000) (% of workforce)
1950 9,289 40.6
1960 9,835 40.9
1970 11,178 45.9
1980 12,947 49.0
1990 9,947 35.3
2000 7,770 26.2
These membership data come from the Certification Officer, but are 
self-reported by unions and include some retired, unemployed and non-UK
residents. The latest Labour Force Survey results (autumn 2001) indicate
that in the UK there are 7.55 million members, including 0.3 million 
self-employed and that 7.25 million employees (29.1%) are union members.
wage premium causing higher labour costs, for example –
resulted in a higher rate of closures among union plants
compared with their non-union counterparts. Nor did
management embark on wholesale derecognition of trade
unions: the derecognition rate was steady at around 1% a
year between 1984 and 1998. Although derecognition in
some national newspapers, TV and the docks generated
bitter industrial disputes and considerable media interest,
such management action in other sectors was quite rare.
Rather, union decline turned mainly on the inability of unions
to achieve recognition in new workplaces, reflecting
Thatcherite views among some managers and the growth of
investment from overseas. In 1980, 60% of establishments
under 10 years old recognised unions, similar to the figure
for workplaces 10 or more years old (65%). But over the
next two decades unions found it progressively harder to
organise new workplaces. By 1998 only just over 25% of
workplaces under 10 years of age recognised a trade
union, half the corresponding figure for older workplaces.
This inability to get much of a foothold in new workplaces
was not confined to private services. More stunning was the
virtual collapse of recognition in newer manufacturing
plants. Only 14% of manufacturing workplaces set up after
1980 recognise a union, compared with 50% of those
established in 1980 or before.
There has been a large rise in the proportion of the
workforce that has never belonged to a union, up from 28%
in 1983 to 48% in 2001. It is not that existing members are
quitting, but more that unions cannot get individuals to join
in the first place. Another facet of declining overall member-
ship is the ebbing of density even where unions are recog-
nised. Younger employees are much less likely to belong to
a union than older workers and this gap in membership
rates by age has grown dramatically. This is a worrying
trend from the unions’ viewpoint, because such non-
membership is prone to persist across generations.
Attracting younger employees and those in new workplaces
into membership is difficult, if they (or their parents) have
never experienced membership and if the benefits of
membership are demonstrably, or perceived to be, lower
than two decades ago.
Unions’ own structures and policies matter, too. Consider
a couple of examples concerning structure. Some unions,
like the TGWU and ASLEF, did not find it easy to align the
shop steward's role in a decentralised system with the
need for a national union voice. And many union mergers
simply resulted in a change of “market share” by shuffling
around existing members, rather than in achieving
economies of scale and extra resources for more effective
organising activity. 
Union policy was often not clear either. The balance
between servicing existing members and organising new
ones was not always thought through. Until recently, the
particular concerns of female members – work/life balance,
parental leave, etc – have had low priority. In dealing with
employers, the union movement took an age to come to
terms with the break up of national bargaining in the private
sector and spread of single union deals. Recent emphasis
on cooperative industrial relations ("partnership”) hints that
these lessons have now been learnt.
So it is not surprising that union membership plummeted in
the 1980s and 1990s. How could unions resist the altered
structure of jobs, rising unemployment (in the 1980s and
1990s), a hostile state, more intense employer opposition
and the growth of individualism? Unions do not thrive in
adversity. In the 1950s and 1960s, under the postwar
settlement and the growth of the welfare state, unions flour-
ished. In the 1970s, when that settlement disintegrated, the
union movement was well dug in – the fifth estate of the
realm which many joined even if they disliked it. But in the
last two decades of higher unemployment, altered industrial
structure and intense product market competition unions
needed the support of workers and employers. By and
large they did not get it. What had previously been conform-
ing behaviour – to recognise and to belong to a union –
became deviant.
Forty years ago Alan Flanders, a most perceptive contem-
porary observer, suggested that unions have both a “vested
interest” and “sword of justice” effect. The vested interest
impact turns on unions’ influence on pay, productivity,
profits, investment and employment. The question is, essen-
tially, what effect do unions have on workplace and firm
performance? The sword of justice – vividly described by
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Flanders as unions’ “stirring music” – is more about fairness
and due process. In addition, unions also impact on
employee relations through their bearing on the industrial
relations climate and job satisfaction. 
If the presence of a union in a workplace or firm raises the
pay level, unless productivity rises correspondingly, finan-
cial performance is likely to be worse. If the product market
is uncompetitive, this might imply a simple transfer from
capital to labour with no efficiency effects, but it is more
likely to lead to lower investment rates and economic senes-
cence. In the 1970s and 1980s the evidence indicated that
union members received a pay premium, but without the
corresponding rise in productivity. If anything, demarca-
tions, unofficial industrial action and multi-unionism lowered
productivity. Hence profitability in workplaces with union
recognition was below that in non-union workplaces. 
Stephen Machin has studied the trend of the union 
wage premium in the 1990s. His findings are summarised
in Table 2. For men, the wage premium fell from 9% in
1991 to zero in 1999, while for women it fell from 16% to
10%. More importantly, there is now no wage benefit for
men in joining a union and no cost in leaving. For women, it
does still pay to be in a union, but not as much as it used to
and not in new jobs.
By the end of the 1990s the average union/non union differ-
ences in labour productivity were also negligible. But there
are two sets of circumstances when union recognition
continues to be associated with lower labour productivity.
First, productivity is lower in workplaces with multi-unionism
and fragmented bargaining. Such multi-unionism, though, is
now rather unusual – only 7% of workplaces are charac-
terised by fragmented bargaining. Second, productivity is
also lower when the product market is monopolistic, the
firm having only between one and five competitors. Here
unions can manage to switch some of the monopoly profit
from the owners of capital to their members.
In the past, the impact of union recognition on wages and
productivity fed through into an adverse effect on profitabil-
ity or financial performance. Now, on average, there are no
significant overall links of this kind. But this “average” result
conceals some interesting findings. Multi-unionism is still
linked to worse financial performance where the bargaining
remains fragmented. Where the firm recognises a union, it
will have a less good financial performance if the union
organises under half the workforce. 
Thus, on average, the impact of unions on firms’ pay, produc-
tivity and profitability is small. In these circumstances it is not
surprising that there is also no strong evidence that union
recognition hinders investment in plant and machinery.
Indeed, the evidence on investment in human capital is that
unionised workplaces invest more in their workforce than
their non-union counterparts. But there remains one
profoundly worrying trend for unions. Other things being
equal, employment in a unionised workplace grows some
3% a year more slowly (or falls 3% a year more quickly) than
in a non-union workplace. Even though it is unlikely that union
activity is itself the cause of this differential change in employ-
ment, which has now been evident for 20 years, if it persists
the implications for future membership levels are serious.
Though the impact of trade unions on economic perform-
ance is more muted than it was twenty years ago, they still
wield the sword of justice in the workplace. Unions narrow
the distribution of pay, promote equal opportunity and family
friendly policies, and lower the rate of industrial injuries.
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Table 2. Union wage effects 1991, 1995, 1999 %
Cross section Joiners Leavers
Males
1991 9 9 -13
1995 6 0 0
1999 0 0 0
Females
1991 16 15 -14
1995 16 6 -8
1999 10 0 0
Data came from British Household Panel Survey. The full details of Machin’s
study will appear in Metcalf (2003).
It used to be thought that the business cycle
helped explain membership levels
The spread of pay among unionised workers is smaller than
the spread among their non-union counterparts. This is
because unions protect the pay of those on low earnings
and because unionised workplaces make more use of
objective criteria – seniority for example – in setting pay
rather than subjective factors, like merit. Unions also
compress the pay structure between different groups in the
labour market: women and men, blacks and whites, and
those with health problems and the healthy. If there were no
unions, the gender pay gap would be wider by 2.6% and
the race pay gap by 1.4% bigger. These are very substan-
tial effects. When it was introduced in 1999, the national
minimum wage particularly impacted on female pay – two
thirds of those affected were women – but it only narrowed
the gender pay gap by a little under 1%. The impact of
unions on narrowing the gender pay gap is three times as
strong as that of the national minimum wage.
Union recognition is associated with a much greater likeli-
hood of the workplace having some form of equal opportu-
nity policy and an array of family friendly policies designed
to encourage female employment. These practices include
parental leave, working from home, term only contracts, and
the possibility of switching from full- to part-time employ-
ment and job shares. Women in unionised workplaces are
much better off in terms of career opportunities, flexible
work arrangements and general support for family respon-
sibilities than their counterparts in non-union workplaces.
Such “family friendly” policies go hand in hand with better
performing workplaces. A workplace with an array of family
friendly policies has a greater likelihood of above average
financial performance, labour productivity, product or service
quality, and lower employee turnover and absentee rates
than one without such practices. Even if the causal mecha-
nism behind such associations is unclear, this evidence is
something for unions to build on in their attempts to appeal
simultaneously to management and to workers.
Unions also cut industrial accidents. An accident in this
context is defined as where an employee has sustained any
one of eight injuries during working hours over the last 12
months: including bone fractures, burns, amputations and
any injury that results in immediate hospitalisation for more
than 24 hours. Unions tend to organise in workplaces
where an accident is more likely to occur, but their
presence lowers the accident rate by a quarter, compared
with non-union plants. This favourable effect occurs
because unions lobby for safety legislation and take indus-
trial action locally to make the workplace safer. Many trade
unions also provide health and safety courses. Further,
where a union is recognised, employees with concerns
about accidents are more likely to be listened to rather than
labelled as a nuisance. 
A union presence also influences workers’ perceptions
about the governance of the workplace. This includes the
climate of relations between management and employees,
the trust employees have in their managers, and managerial
performance. On average, workplace governance is
perceived as poorer among employees in workplaces with
recognised unions, relative to their counterparts in non-
union establishments. Better perceptions about governance
in non-union workplaces may flow directly from the use of
briefing groups, team meetings and the like. 
This “average” finding is only part of the story. Once the
decision is taken to recognise a union, governance is
profoundly affected by the way the parties go about their
business. First, governance is perceived to be better when
there is a balance of power between management and
union in the workplace. Very strong or very weak unions
detract from a good climate or high trust. Second, when the
union is recognised it is better for management to support
membership: recognition coupled with hostility to individual
membership produces the worse outcomes. Third, unions
are perceived to be more effective when workplace gover-
nance is good. 
Managers’ perceptions of the climate of employee relations
have also been analysed and confirm the thrust of these
findings concerning individual employees. Unions with on-
site representatives, which have the capacity to operate as
a strong voice for workers, or a strong agent for the
employer, are held by managers to generate a good climate.
The implications are clear-cut. Once the decision is taken to
recognise a union it makes sense to encourage member-
ship and ensure that the union is effective in representing
employees. 
What can unions do to reverse declining density and
achieve a sustained rise in membership? Broadly there are
two routes to revival. Either employment in unionised
sectors of the economy has to grow relative to non-union
employment, or unions must engage in more intense organ-
ising activity and enhance their appeal to both employers
and potential members.
It is unlikely that any boost in the aggregate number of jobs
will occur disproportionately in the already unionised sector.
In the (highly unionised) public sector, while the number of
teachers, nurses and police is rising, overall there will not
be much growth in employment in the next decade. In
manufacturing, employment now is only a little over a third
of its 1966 peak and unions anyway find it just as difficult to
get recognised in new manufacturing plants as in private
services. Similarly there is no suggestion of strong 
growth in jobs in utilities or transport. It is likely, instead, 
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The Union decline turned mainly on the inability
to achieve recognition in new workplaces
that the major share of any growth in employment will 
occur in private services, where the present union density
is only 15%.
So unions will have to invest more in organising and servic-
ing activity. This may yield a larger return presently than in
the last two decades, because the climate of opinion
fostered by the state is no longer hostile to collective labour
institutions. But the allocation of such servicing and organ-
ising investment requires considerable thought. Consider
Table 3. It shows that 8.9 million employees are covered by
collective agreements, but over one third of them (3.4
million) are free riders, as they are not members of a union.
Looking at the evidence the other way round, a quarter (1.7
million) of total union members (7.2 million) are not covered
by collective agreements. (This includes teachers and
nurses, whose pay is settled by arbitration rather than
collective agreements.) In the last decade, many (particu-
larly smaller) workplaces have abandoned collective
bargaining without actually derecognising the union. By far
the majority of employees (57%) is neither covered by a
collective agreement nor belongs to a union. 
The evidence in Table 3 provides serious food for thought
for unions. First, absorbing the free riders – so-called “in-
fill” recruitment – might be an attractive (and cheap) method
of boosting membership. Second, retaining those members
where the firm no longer engages in collective bargaining
may prove difficult, because the union must convince such
workers that membership is still worthwhile. Third, and
most difficult, making inroads into the 14 million who are
neither covered by collective agreements nor belong to a
union is vital for any resurgence. But there is a delicate
balancing act here: organising expenditure aimed at this
group represents a “tax” on existing members, who may
then become free-riders if subscriptions rise to finance the
necessary organising.
Around 20% of these 14 million workers either desire union
representation or would be very likely to join a union, if one
were available. This suggests a “representation gap” of
some 2.8 million employees, a potentially rich pool of
employees for unions to organise. However, for effective
union presence in the workplace to follow, these targeted
employees need to be concentrated. There are some inter-
esting occupations involved here. Recently MSF-Amicus
signed up some 200 Church of England clergy who have
no employment rights, since the courts have held that their
employer is divine not earthly. And the GMB has had some
success in recruiting lap dancers!
Recognition occurs voluntarily, or via the law. Voluntary
recognition stems either from true love (cooperation
between capital and labour), or a marriage of convenience
(a pragmatic second best). The legal route, inevitably
associated with adversarial industrial relations, is a
shotgun marriage, imposed on a resistant employer by an
arm of the state.
Under the legal route, if a union can prove a majority of
membership in the bargaining unit, then it gains recognition.
If not, a ballot is held in which the union must win more than
50% of the votes cast in the ballot and must have a “yes”
vote of at least 40% of the workforce in the bargaining unit.
The direct effect of this law has been tiny. Fewer than
20,000 workers have been covered by recognition orders
since the law came into effect in 2000. However, its indirect
or shadow effect is larger. Over 1,000 voluntary agree-
ments have been signed in the last three years, bringing
around 250,000 new workers under recognition. But the
union focus remains traditional: the (ex-)public services,
manufacturing, finance, transport and communication. Only
one in six newly covered workers are in the rest of the
private sector.
It is plausible that, in the longer run, the passage of the EU
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Table 3. Coverage of collective agreements and union membership:
UK employees in employment, autumn 2001
Covered by collective agreement
Yes No Total
Yes 5.5m (22%) 1.7m (7%) 7.2m (29%) 
Union member No 3.4m (14%) 14.1m (57%) 17.5m (71%) 
Total 8.9m (36%) 15.8m (64%) 24.7m (100%)
Calculated from Kevin Brock “Trade union membership: an analysis of data
from the autumn 2001 LFS”, Labour Market Trends, July 2002, 343-354.
Example: 8.9 million employees (36%) are covered by collective bargaining.
Of these, 5.5 million (22%) are union members and 3.4 million (14%) are not
union members.
There is now no wage benefit
for men in joining a union
Directive on Information and Consultation will influence
unions’ futures rather more than the recognition law. It
establishes, for the first time, permanent and general
arrangements for information and consultation for all
workers in the UK in organisations employing more than 50
employees. It will cover three quarters of the British labour
force by 2008. Some employers may see this as an oppor-
tunity to create weak voice mechanisms. Others may see it
as a chance to institute stronger arrangements, comple-
menting other aspects of human resource management.
The tough job for unions is to build on these schemes and
to maintain and expand their role within them. The evidence
seems to be that a union presence complements these
arrangements and makes them more effective.
In broad terms there are just over 3 million free riders and
just under 3 million employees who would be very likely to
join the union, if one existed at their place of work. If unions
could organise annually 5% of this 6 million pool of poten-
tial members, while keeping their 7.2 million existing
members happy, their fortunes would be transformed.
David Metcalf is Professor of Industrial Relations at the LSE and 
Director of the Leverhulme Trust Programme on the Future of
Trade Unions in Modern Britain at the CEP. For further details of
the Programme and background to this article please refer to
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/future_of_unions.
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ountries tend to be
judged successes
or failures by their
ability to deliver
jobs to those who
want them and an
adequate standard
of living. So labour
markets are important. The vast
majority of us are wholly dependent
on the labour market for our
livelihood. So how the labour market
works and how it might be improved
are also important.
Economists have had a lot to say on
this subject. The default position of
most of them is that, in the absence
of government regulation, the
workings of labour markets can be
well approximated by the textbook
model of perfect competition. In this
idealised world, workers face a
market wage for their labour that is
equal to their productivity and a large
number of employers, all competing
for their services. In this world, if they
found their employer attempting to
lower their wages (even by 1p), the
workers would all instantaneously
walk out the door to seek
employment elsewhere. Getting or
losing jobs in this world is no big
deal: they are everywhere.
This description of the labour market
does not fit well with the way it is
experienced by most of us. We go to
the pub to celebrate when we get a
job and we go to the pub to drown
our sorrows when we lose one.
Surveys that ask people to name
something important that happened
in the last year typically find that job-
related events are the second most
important category, after family
events like births, marriages,
divorces and deaths.
Getting and losing jobs is a big deal
to so many of us for the simple
reason that it is not as easy to find
work as the textbook model of
perfect competition would have us
believe. Finding work we like in a
place and at a time convenient for us
is hard. Information about jobs is not
perfect and there are substantial
costs involved in changing jobs. The
other side of this coin is that our
employers have more power over us
than the model of perfect competition
would have us believe. If an
employer cuts our wages, it may be
true that we are more likely to leave
than before and that it will be harder
for the employer to replace us, but it
is simply not true that all of us would
walk out immediately.
Employers are interested in profits
and they use their power over
workers to keep wages down
wherever they can. Economists have
another textbook model appropriate to
this situation: it is called monopsony.
Monopsony means “a condition in
which there is only one buyer for the
product of a large number of sellers”.
So it refers to a situation in which
there is only a single employer
available to buy the labour of workers.
While the stereotype of a mill town or
pit village in the early days of the
Industrial Revolution might fit this
definition literally, few workers today
really only have one potential
employer. But the lessons of the
textbook model of monopsony apply
wherever the opportunities of workers
are finite.
I have just written a book,
“Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect
Competition in Labor Markets”,
arguing that our understanding of the
workings of labour markets would be
much improved if we adopted the
commonsense perspective that
employers have some monopsony
power over their workers and
abandoned the view that employers
are powerless in the face of
impersonal market forces. Much of
by Alan Manning
More sellers than buyers
Alan Manning has been looking at the
weaknesses of the classical model of market
competition in explaining the behaviour of the
labour market and argues that we should
learn lessons from the monopsony model.
Information 
about jobs 
is not perfect
1975 hourly wages for women went
from 65% to 75% of the male level.
There was no noticeable effect on
women’s employment, which
continued to rise throughout this
period. This would be a serious
puzzle, if one believed that labour
markets are perfectly competitive. It is
not a puzzle, if one believes that
labour markets are monopsonistic. 
The “monopsony” approach 
suggests that one reason women get
paid less than men is that the
constraints imposed on their working
lives by the allocation of domestic
responsibilities in most households
mean they are more vulnerable to
exploitation by employers. In this
case their pay can be raised without
jeopardizing their jobs.
Second, an example from the present,
Consider the case for and against the
minimum wage. Surveys of
economists typically find a large
degree of consensus that the
minimum wage is a bad policy,
harming those it sets out to help by
pricing some low-wage workers out of
their jobs. In these beliefs, economists
differ markedly from the general
public, for whom the minimum wage
is probably the single “left-wing”
policy that commands the most
support. The economists, as usual,
are relying on the textbook model of
perfect competition, where wages
equal productivity. If wages rise faster
than productivity, it will not be
profitable for firms to employ the
workers and job losses will result.
In contrast, the monopsonisitic
approach argues that, because
employers will use their power over
workers to pay them a wage below
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the book is devoted to documenting
how this view of labour markets
improves our understanding of a
wide range of labour market
phenomena. This should keep
academic labour economists happy,
but why is it anything more than an
academic argument?
The reason is that one’s views on how
the labour market works affect one’s
view on the wisdom of various policy
interventions. For, as Keynes over-
quotedly observed in the General
Theory: “The ideas of economists and
political philosophers, both when they
are right and when they are wrong,
are more powerful than is commonly
understood. Indeed the world is ruled
by little else. Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt
from any intellectual influence, are
usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling
their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back”. 
Today’s scribblers are still hard at
work: they can be found (among other
places) on university campuses, in the
pages of the Economist and in the
reports of the OECD. Asked to
analyse some labour market policy,
the instinctive response of most
labour economists is to fall back on
the predictions of the textbook model
of perfect competition. 
If one thinks that labour markets
correspond closely to the textbook
theory of perfect competition, then one
is likely to be hostile to interventions
designed to remedy perceived
deficiencies in its “free” workings. A
famous result in economic theory tells
us that the outcome of a perfectly
competitive market will be efficient,
though there is no reason to believe it
is fair. Any intervention in the labour
market is rather grudgingly tolerated
on the grounds of equity, though
typically associated with mutterings
about the efficiency costs. This
presumption that the “free market” is
efficient has a powerful hold over the
minds of economists.
However, if one thinks that employers
have some monopsony power over
their workers, then one does not
believe that the “free” market
necessarily delivers an efficient
outcome and one is inclined to be
more sympathetic towards labour
market interventions. This does not
mean that any intervention is always
to be considered good, just that there
is no longer the presumption that it is
always bad. Interventions should be
innocent until proven guilty and 
not the other way round. To make all
this more concrete, let us consider
some examples from the past,
present and future.
First, one from the past. Not many
people argue these days that equal
pay legislation should be abolished,
but there was considerable
controversy about it around the time
of the introduction of the Equal Pay
Act in 1970 and the Sex
Discrimination Act in 1975. At that
time, it was relatively common to hear
economists argue that, if women
earned less than men, that must be
because they were less productive
(because that is the only source of
possible wage gaps in a perfectly
competitive market) and that any
attempt to artificially reduce the
gender pay gap through legislation
would inevitably result in women
being priced out of jobs. 
The simple reason why one does not
hear this argument any more is that
this prophecy of doom failed to come
true. Although there is still a gender
pay gap, it is lower now than in the
past and the Equal Pay Act led to a
noticeable rise in the pay of women
relative to men: between 1970 and
Interventions 
should be 
innocent until 
proven guilty
Women’s 
employment 
continued 
to rise
their productivity, there is some
scope for raising wages without
jeopardizing jobs. There is, of course,
a limit to how much wages can be
raised before job losses result: nice
as the thought is, there is little doubt
that a minimum wage of £50 per hour
would cause serious economic
problems. But, the modest levels for
the minimum wage chosen in
countries like the UK and the US do
not seem to cause job losses among
those affected.  
Third an example from the future. The
British government is currently
resisting implementation of the EU’s
Working Time Directive, which would
limit the number of hours that can be
worked in a week. The argument is
that, if workers want a shorter
working week, the market can be
relied upon to deliver it and so there is
no case for intervention. But the
monopsony approach suggests that,
because employers make profits out
of workers, they will always be
pressing them to work more hours
than they would freely chose. At the
very least, we need to take a close
look at the experience in Continental
European countries with policies to
reduce the working week before
rejecting such legislation here.   
Then there are the commonly
accepted explanations of the widening
gap in wages between rich and poor
in countries like the US and the UK in
the past twenty years. Seeing that
wages in low-wage jobs are growing
more slowly than those in high-wage
jobs, most economists have
concluded that the explanation lies in
a shift in demand from low-wage to
high-wage jobs. This shift in demand
is thought to be driven by changes in
technology in general and information
technology in particular. This widening
gap in wage inequality is often
regarded as an inevitable by-product
of “progress” – of which we are all
naturally in favour. 
But this is not the only plausible story
to explain what has happened. There
turns out to be a close relationship in
the US between the evolution of
wage inequality and the level of the
real minimum wage. In the 1980s,
wage inequality rose sharply and the
federal minimum wage fell in real
terms, since it was left at the same
nominal level. From the late 1980s
there were three rises in the minimum
wage, all associated with a decline in
wage inequality that was then
reversed as the real value of the
minimum wage was eroded by
inflation. There would seem a strong
prima facie case that the minimum
wage should be given a prominent
role in explanations of US wage
inequality and that the rising gap
between rich and poor should be
seen as the result of government
policy, rather than inexorable
technical progress.
But those who believe that the labour
market is perfectly competitive just
cannot accept this explanation. The
reason is their faith that a rise in the
minimum wage must price some low-
skill workers out of jobs. The fall in
the real value of the minimum wage in
the 1980s should have priced some
low-skill workers back into
employment. But employment rates
fell among these workers at this time. 
If one accepts that the labour market
is monopsonistic, then there is no
mystery here. There is no particular
reason to think that the minimum
wage, set at modest levels, will cost
any jobs at all. So it is quite possible
to reconcile the view that the minimum
wage was the main culprit in
explaining the rise in wage inequality
with the observation that employment
rates of low-skill workers fell.
For the UK one cannot tell exactly the
same story about the rise in wage
inequality because, for most of the
last twenty years, we have not had a
national minimum wage. But welfare
benefits have only been increased in
line with prices, not wages; trade
unions have been in decline; and the
Wages Councils, which set minimum
wages in certain sectors, have been
abolished. All these institutional
changes act to lower the floor to
wages in the labour market and can
explain why low-wage workers have
been doing so badly.
There is a theme that runs through all
of these examples: the wisdom of
particular policies cannot be judged
by economists armed with nothing
but some pet economic theories.
They can only be judged by their
effects. In many ways, this is in tune
with the spirit of the times, which
demands “evidence-based policy-
making” and emphasises a pragmatic
and commonsense approach to
public policy, free from excessive
ideological baggage. 
It is time for labour economists to
dump the comforting certainties that
the textbook model of perfect
competition appears to offer and to
recognise that the world is a more
complicated and messy place. 
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Alan Manning is Director of the CEP’s
Labour Markets programme and Professor
of Economics at the LSE.
His book “Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect
Competition in Labor Market” will be
published by Princeton University shortly.  
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